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Abstract. Systems using 5G are expected to be used in various cases
of Society 5.0 and Industrie 4.0 such as smart cities, smart factories,
and also critical infrastructures. These systems are essential for our life,
thus cyberattacks against the system must be prevented. In this paper,
we tackle two problems posed by 5G features: system construction us-
ing multi-vendor devices and softwarized functions. Specifically, there
are supply-chain risks that malicious devices are used in the construc-
tion phase. Moreover, the softwarized network functions are easy to be
attacked compared to hardware. To cope with these problems, we pro-
pose a concept of architecture comprising a blockchain to record security
events including supply-chain information and a tamper detection engine
to ensure the integrity of software components in 5G system. We imple-
ment the initial prototype of the architecture and show its feasibility.
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1 Introduction
5G is a next-generation network architecture and it is expected to be used for
various cases such as smart cities, smart factories, and operations of critical
infrastructures. To use 5G for such cases, the security of the 5G system must be
ensured because cyberattacks against such infrastructure cause serious damages
to our society.
Security properties of 5G are improved from 4G. For example, a security mea-
sure against IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) catcher, which leaks
user location information, has been introduced in 5G specifications. However, we
can identify the remaining security risks related to 5G features. Specifically, we
can identify two 5G features related to security. The first feature is the construc-
tion of 5G systems using multi-vendor devices. As 5G system is sophisticated
and complex compared to 4G, we cannot construct a system with devices from
a single vendor. Moreover, standard APIs are discussed and specified by 3GPP
and ORAN alliance. In such a scenario, we need to take care of supply-chain
risks that malicious devices are used in a system construction using third-party
devices connected with the standard APIs. The second feature is the softwariza-
tion of network functions. Specifically, Network Function Virtualization (NFV)
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and Multi-access Edge Computing1 (MEC) are used in 5G systems. Moreover,
in some cases of private 5G, 5G core components will be deployed on Cloud [1].
Attacks against such software are easy compared to attacks against the hard-
ware due to the major vulnerabilities such as buffer overflow, modification of
executable, and so on. We can identify these features in 4G systems, but they
are more obvious in 5G systems.
To cope with the above problems, we propose a concept of architecture with
a blockchain to securely store supply-chain information and a tamper detection
engine to measure the integrity of the software. The system information such as
supply-chain information, tamper detection results, and system configurations
are recorded into the blockchain. Using the data in the blockchain, an audit is
performed to prove that the 5G system is secure. Using the proposed architec-
ture, we believe that the 5G systems can be used for critical infrastructure which
requires strong security properties.
In summary, our major contributions are as follows:
– A concept of secure 5G architecture to ensure the integrity of the entire 5G
stack
– A blockchain-based event record mechanism for securely storing information
including supply-chain information, tamper detection results, and system
configurations used for a security audit of the 5G system.
2 Problem statement
2.1 Supply-chain risks
In 3G and 4G era, a system is constructed using a single vendor or a few vendors.
However, in the 5G era, each system tends to be constructed using multi-vendor
devices. This is because the whole system and each device used in the system
become complex and it is difficult for a single vendor to supply devices of the en-
tire stack of the 5G system. Moreover, telecommunication carriers would prefer
an open system to avoid enclosure by a single vendor. For example, the open in-
terface of Radio Access Network (RAN) is discussed and standardized in ORAN
alliance 2.
Because of the above situation, we have to take care of supply-chain risks.
In the case of construction using a trusted single vendor, the supply-chain risk
is not so critical, because the vendor can control the supply-chain and enforces
security-by-design policies for all developers. However, in the case of construction
using multi-vendor devices, we have to ensure the trustworthiness of all devices
from the external suppliers. Specifically, it should be proved that all devices are
constructed in a secure development manner, e.g. only using valid hardware and
software components.
We solve this problem by recording supply-chain information into a blockchain
in Section 3.2.
1 It also called Mobile Edge Computing
2 ORAN alliance, https://www.o-ran.org/
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2.2 Attacks against softwarized network functions in 5G
Softwarization is a trend of network systems. Traditionally, network functions
are realized by hardware, but recently many functions are implemented using
software for flexibility and cost efficiency. For example, NFV realizes the flexible
deployment of services by chaining small software components. In most cases,
virtualized network functions are deployed on virtual machines. Moreover, for
the quick and low-cost deployment of 5G systems, 5G core functions could be
deployed on cloud services such as Amazon EC2. In addition, in 5G systems, the
MEC is introduced for minimizing latency by deploying a computing node near
to the end-user location in the 5G core network [7].
Considering the above situation, we can identify risks about attacks against
such software. Specifically, in case that software of a device in 5G has a vulner-
ability, the attacker can exploit the vulnerability and compromise the device.
Of course, software components are used in the 4G systems, but considering the
above situation, the risk would be increased from the 4G system era.
We solve this problem by deploying tamper detection engines into devices of
the entire 5G system in Section 3.3
3 Architecture
Here we propose architecture to cope with the problems discussed in the previous
section.
3.1 Overview
The proposed architecture comprises user devices (e.g. smartphones, IoT de-
vices), 5G devices (e.g. RAN and 5G core), servers (Figure 1), a secure event
storage using blockchain, and tamper detection engines.
To securely store the security events, a blockchain is deployed. Specifically,
supply-chain information and other security-related information such as logs of
security appliances are recorded into the blockchain. Using this information, an
auditor proves that the system is in the clean state and correctly operated.
To ensure the trustworthiness of the entire system, all layers should be pro-
tected. To this end, tamper detection engines are deployed in each device of all
layers. The detection results are sent to the blockchain and used for security
audits as well as the other information.
3.2 Secure event storage using blockchain
Blockchain is a distributed and trusted database that ensures the integrity of the
recorded data. Specifically, each block of the blockchain contains a hash value of
the previous block, thus malicious modification of a block requires modification
of all hash values prior to the block. To ensure the consistency of the data,
blockchain uses a consensus algorithm such as Proof of Work (PoW) and Proof
of Stake (PoS).
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Fig. 1. Conceptual architecture
There are two types of membership of blockchain: permissionless and per-
missioned. As for permissionless blockchain, participation is open to everyone,
for example in bitcoin case, everyone can mine the coins. As for permissioned
blockchain, its membership is pre-defined and members with permission can only
access the blockchain. In our use case, the information is shared with limited de-
vice manufacturers and 5G system operators, thus permissioned blockchain is
better.
In the general blockchain model, data recorded by the blockchain are shared
with the members. To limit the members accessing the specific data, we use a
blockchain supporting access control [5]. Specifically, a satellite chain constructed
by specific nodes is created and data on the satellite chain can only be accessed
by the node owners of the satellite chain.
Recording supply-chain information To ensure that the 5G system is con-
structed using valid devices, supply chain information can be recorded into the
blockchain. Specifically, network and IoT device manufacturers register supply-
chain information of their product, for example, a list of hardware and software
components and makers of the components. To build a 5G system without de-
vices including invalid components, the SIer of the 5G system can check the
component list on the blockchain. Moreover, the operator and users of the 5G
system can check the component list as well.
The above information is used for the audit as evidence, thus the informa-
tion must not be modified. In the case of malicious manufactures/insiders, the
information should be managed in a distributed manner and its integrity should
be ensured. To meet this requirement, we adopt blockchain.
Other information to be recorded In addition to the supply-chain infor-
mation, other types of information can be recorded. The following are possible
types of information to be stored in the blockchain.
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Maintainance histories Histories about maintenance such as update and repair
can be recorded into the blockchain. Using this information, an audit about the
maintenance can be performed.
Event logs from security appliances. The security event logs from security appli-
ances can also be recorded in the blockchain and be used for a security au-
dit of the system. The information also is useful for incident handling. For
example, logs of a firewall, an intrusion detection system, and an authentica-
tion/authorization mechanism can be recorded.
Network configurations. To ensure the correct behavior of the entire network
system, the correctness of the network configuration is required in addition to
the integrity of the devices. To this end, routing information and network slice
configurations can be recorded.
System events. To monitor system behavior, system events can be recorded. For
example, we can use 5G-related events such as registrations of user equipment,
creations of sessions, errors from the network facilities.
Tamper detection results. To ensure the integrity of the entire 5G system, tamper
detection results are also recorded. We will discuss it in the next subsection.
3.3 Tamper detection engine
To cope with the attacks against the software, the tamper detection engines
monitor the integrity of devices. Specifically, to detect malware-infected devices
and tampered devices by the attacker, the tamper detection engine periodically
measures the integrity of the software running on the devices. Then, the tamper
detection engine sends a measurement report to the blockchain.
Here, a security risk is attacks against the tamper detection engine itself.
Specifically, an attacker may disable the tamper detection engine, then the at-
tacker performs the second action for the attacker’s primary purpose. To protect
the tamper detection engine, the engine can be deployed in Trusted Execu-
tion Environment (TEE) which creates an isolated software execution environ-
ment [4].
3.4 Audit/Inspection using the data on the blockchain
A security console shows the entire 5G security status by retrieving the data
from the blockchain. Specifically, using the data of the tamper detection results,
a system administrator can checks whether the system is clean or not. In case
that there are compromised devices, the administrator performs the incident
response to the devices based on the data. The other information discussed in
Section 3.2 is also displayed on this console.
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Fig. 2. Prototype of a security management console
4 Implementation and evaluation
We adopt our tamper detection engine using TrustZone of ARM Cortex-A [4]
and deploy the tamper detection engine to a small robotic arm. As for the
blockchain, we use our original implementation [5]. The tamper detection engine
and a blockchain node are connected via HTTP and REST interfaces.
We also implement a security management console that shows the security
status of the entire system (Figure 2). The console retrieves tamper detection
results from the blockchain and shows the entire network topology and devices.
In the figure, the compromised devices are shown using red icons. On the right
side of the figure, the table shows the details of the events including integrity
measurement results of the robot arms. In addition, extra information such as
supply-chain information recorded on the blockchain can also be displayed.
5 Discussion
5.1 Integration with other security measures
NIST cybersecurity framework3 defines 5 functions (identify, protect, detect, re-
spond, recover) and the proposed architecture contributes to the identify func-
tion and the detect function. Other security functions are also needed to be
deployed. Specifically, protect, respond, and recover mechanisms should be inte-
grated to the proposed architecture. For example, major security functions such
3 https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework
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as authentication/authorization, intrusion prevention, DDoS mitigation should
be deployed in addition to the proposed architecture. To integrate the proposed
architecture and existing security functions, security logs from these security
functions also can be recorded into the blockchain. And also, recover functions
can leverage data in the blockchain to perform proper recovery from a compro-
mised state.
5.2 Information sharing across organizations
For hardening the systems, security information needs to be shared across or-
ganizations such as the device manufacturers and users of the device (e.g. 5G
system operators). For example, vulnerability information and new attack meth-
ods information are useful for both of them.
However, some types of information such as specific network configurations
are not willing to be shared because they reveal the internal structure of the
network operators. In our architecture, accesses to such confidential information
are controlled by the satellite chain[5] which can enforce access control.
5.3 Who has blockchain nodes?
Blockchain is a distributed database, thus there is a question; Who should have
the blockchain nodes? Currently, we assume that members of trusted consortium
comprising device manufacturers, 5G system integrators have blockchain nodes.
In addition, user organizations of 5G system can have the blockchain nodes.
However, it depends on an operation model of the proposed architecture and we
will further discuss this question as our future work.
6 Related work
Here, we introduce research about security architecture for 5G. Rahimi et. al.
have studied the security of 5G-IoT architecture and summarized attacks against
the architecture [6]. Moreover, they have proposed 5G-IoT security taxonomy
with five layers: an application layer, a communication layer, a network layer, a
data layer, and a perception layer. Our architecture does not cover all attacks
pointed out by this work, thus our architecture needs to be integrated to existing
security solutions as discussed in Section 5.1
Blanc et al. have proposed security architecture relying on virtualization and
softwarization [3]. In this architecture, security functions are dynamically de-
ployed in a security-as-a-service manner. Specifically, the architecture as two
major functions: a security monitoring framework to detect security events and
a security orchestrator reacts against the security events. The security services
are provided as virtual functions and security service chaining is performed.
Adam and Ping have proposed a framework for security event management [2].
The proposed framework performs automated event data collection across layers
such as a telecommunication layer and an IaaS layer for monitoring of shared
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resources. The framework also performs automated mitigation of security SLA
violations by reconfiguring security functions. These architectures and our ar-
chitecture are in the complementary relation. Specifically, the concept of tamper
detection and the blockchain-based event storage can be integrated with their
detection and response mechanisms.
Sinclair et. al have proposed an architecture for drug supply chain manage-
ment using blockchain [8]. Our architecture is an extension of their concept and
uses system construction information and operation information.
7 Conclusion and Future work
To build a secure 5G system, secure monitoring and audit are essential, especially
for critical infrastructures requiring strong security. To this end, we propose an
architecture comprising the tamper detection engine and the secure event storage
using blockchain. By inspecting the data on the blockchain, the security state of
the 5G system can be proved.
As for future work, we will implement the entire system and conduct eval-
uation using a 5G system for pointing out deployment and operation issues.
Moreover, we will consider non-technical matters such as trusted partnerships
and collaborative operations among device manufacturers, system integrators,
and 5G system operators.
This research is still a work in progress, but we believe that the proposed
architecture boosts applications of 5G systems to critical infrastructures.
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